This report is the outcome of an extensive analysis conducted by the Volunteer Activists (VA) on labor-related issues and protests in Iran, covering the period from January to June 2024. It marks the fourth installment in a semiannual series aimed at providing regular updates on the labor situation in Iran.
VA‘s objective in doing so is to offer the global community a clearer understanding of the labor challenges and protests occurring in Iran. Recognizing these issues on an international level is crucial for advancing Iran‘s labor movement. Additionally, understanding both the needs of workers and trade unions in Iran allows international donors to better design their programs and initiatives, thereby improving organizational effectiveness. VA‘s connections within Iran enable it to supply this important information effectively.
The complex and diverse nature of Iran‘s labor landscape required thorough and detailed research to provide a comprehensive overview of the current issues and struggles. Our assessment included both primary and secondary sources, with VA conducting (online) interviews with local labor activists and consulting verified media reports, published research, and social media monitoring.
Our research over the first six months of 2024, shows dynamics typical for the state of labor under the government of President Ebrahim Raisi (2021-2024). In spite of governmental tendencies to try and suppress (organized) labor protests, brave workers nevertheless organized strikes on company premises and sometimes also took to the street or presidential buildings. Just like in preceding years, these employees were outdone in numbers by protesting pensioners, who turned out in even larger numbers, often holding rallies in front of provincial and national governmental buildings. In some cases, these protests actions also overlapped. Primary reasons for protests among workers and pensioners included harsh living conditions, unpaid wages and insurance benefits, non-implementation of laws and regulations, low wages, lack of job security, and objections to certain (planned) governmental policy measures, including the (limited) wage approval for year 1403 (21 March 2024 - 20 March 2025) and a planned retirement age increase.
One difference with the last six months of 2023 was that there was slightly less governmental repression of labor protests. This seemed merely due to the Iranian New Year and the holiday season rather than being the result of a deliberate change of direction of governmental policy, however. In any case, while protesting for ordinary workers could already be risky – from potential job loss to being arrested – being active as a labor activist posed the biggest threat. As part of its policy to try and erode worker protests, the Iranian leadership particularly targets individuals that (are seen as) masterminds behind such actions.
Protests Statistics
Over 659 labor protests were recorded across 82 cities in Iran from January to July 2024. These protests reflect widespread dissatisfaction and unrest among workers and pensioners throughout the country.
Drivers of Protests
The predominant driver of protests remains high inflation, which has not been matched by corresponding increases in wages and pensions. This economic strain has significantly impacted the livelihoods of workers and retirees.
Another major point of contention has been the mismanagement of companies, which has exacerbated economic difficulties and contributed to the growing unrest among employees.
Government Response
There was a slight reduction in governmental repression of labor protests during this period, which appears to be more related to the Iranian New Year and the holiday season rather than a substantive policy shift.
Labor activists continue to face high risks, including potential job loss and arrest, particularly those who are seen as leaders or masterminds behind the protests.
In the period under study, the premature death of Raisi in a helicopter crash on 19th of May 2024 was a major event.
Unsurprisingly, Raisi’s temporary succession by former first vice-president and fellow ‘hardliner’ Mohammed Mokhber, did not lead to a changing government stance regarding labor issues in Iran. Depending on whether Iran’s new president, to be appointed later in 2024, will be of a similar hardliner faction as Raisi or a reformist one, this might change.
To help Iranian workers secure an outcome that is as positive as possible to them, there are several actions that can be taken both by Iranian labor activists and the international community, ranging from increased collaboration with likeminded parties to setting up platforms to facilitate the exchange of ideas. Meanwhile, educating the Iranian public about their socio-economic rights also remains important.
The first half of 2024 illustrated many typical dynamics of then president Ebrahim Raisi ‘s rule, reflecting broader strategies of Iran ‘s hardline regime.
Key aspects of this policy included:
This led to a surge in labor protests driven by worsening living conditions, primarily due to the continued stark mismatch between wages and pensions versus skyrocketing inflation rates. Consequently, ordinary Iranians struggled to put food on the table and maintain shelter. Their plight was intensified by inadequate labor law enforcement, resulting in delayed payouts and unsafe working conditions.
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Unmet demands
Unlike in previous years, no concessions were made regarding the demands of the strikes or protests not even to groups with significant leverage such as lorry drivers or oil workers. This could be due to the regime’s own economic pressures including price inflation and heightened expenditure on arms.
Other distinctive government actions in the period under study include:
Less than usual suppression of Independent Labor Unions
There were suppression of workers’ protests and the activities of independent labor unions, but it was less intense than in preceding years. For instance, there were no major court cases against labor activists. The holidays due to the Persian New Year in March, which commonly delay procedures, likely played a role in this. Other possible explanations include the government fearing more labor unrest following arrests, which already ran high.
Targeting Quasi-Governmental Labor Organizations
The government targeted its quasi-governmental labor organizations. For the first time, the regime forbade Islamic Labor Councils from organizing any Labor Day activities and ousted a labor representative from the Supreme Labor Council for being too bold.
This was most likely because even within these ranks, workers’ resistance towards government socioeconomic policy appears to be growing. It is perhaps telling that the successor of the ousted workers’ representative, along with the remaining labor representative in the Supreme Labor Council, walked out of negotiations when the government sided with employers to keep the minimum wage increase well below the inflation level.
Meanwhile, the state’s law-making efforts were mixed. (Proposed) changes were both detrimental and beneficial to workers. Beneficial plans that offered more job security and the indexation of pensions were not new, however, and were still in the pipeline after many years.
The failure to pressure the Iranian government to adjust the minimum wage for inflation - despite the action of the worker representatives in the Supreme Labor Council, and the online petitions by workers which gained a lot of traction, Iranian workers de facto gained nothing in the period under study.
